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ABSTRACT 
 
 Religious fundamentalism has been found to predict endorsement of aggressive 
counterterrorism techniques, such as the use of severe interrogations and pre-emptive 
military attacks (e.g. Barnes, Brown & Osterman, 2012). The present study tested 
whether a perceived increase in secularism constitutes a psychological threat to American 
religious fundamentalists, and thus increases endorsement of such counterterrorism 
tactics. Replicating previous research, religious fundamentalism was found to positively 
predict endorsement of aggressive counterterrorism techniques, even when controlling for 
ideology and party identification. Contrary to hypothesis, the secularism prime had no 
effect. An unpredicted finding of this study was that religious fundamentalism only 
related to the counterterrorism attitudes of political experts, not political novices. This 
moderation via expertise suggests that, rather than having a direct psychological effect 
(such as out-group aggression), fundamentalism’s relationship to such attitudes emerges 
through the application of political knowledge.  
 1 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
There are two growing forces shaping American politics today: religious 
fundamentalism, and secularism. While it may seem wholly unlikely that such contrary 
ideals could simultaneously gain influence, survey research suggests that this is the case 
(e.g. Green & Dionne, 2008). Whereas there was once a more moderately-religious 
mainstream, the current religious landscape is now more polarized. The religiously-
unaffiliated and the “less observant” represent the largest religious groups supporting the 
Democratic Party, while observant Evangelical Protestants and observant Catholics are 
the most frequent religious identities Republican Party supporters (Green & Dionne, 
2008).   
The areas where religion explicitly informs political attitudes are numerous: 
abortion, birth control, same sex marriage, and stem cell research are just a few. In each 
of these cases, we see ancient scripture pitted against aspects of modernization. But 
research suggests that the mere salience of secularism could also inform political attitudes 
of fundamentalists in more unexpected ways.  
The presently-proposed study will create a scenario that measures the 
psychological effect of one growing tendency (secularism) on the other  
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(fundamentalism). When primed with the knowledge that secularism is gaining influence 
in American society, how will fundamentalists react? Does the salience of secularism's 
rise prompt fundamentalists to adjust their political attitudes and approaches to public 
policy? 
Specifically, I will explore the relationship between two distinct concepts 
associated with conservatism: religious fundamentalism, and endorsement of militant 
counterterrorism tactics. American subjects measuring high on Altemeyer and 
Hunsberger's Revised Religious Fundamentalism scale (2004) will be presented with 
literature suggesting that the United States is becoming more secular; subsequently, I will 
measure their attitudes towards a range of potential counter-terrorism tactics. I predict 
that, among religious fundamentalists, exposure to evidence of increased secularism in 
the United States will prompt endorsement of more aggressive counterterrorism tactics. 
 The relationship between “secularism salience” and national security attitudes has 
not been studied directly in psychological research. The two domains do not appear to 
logically relate. For instance, politicians are often described as emphasizing social issues 
(often including religiously-informed attitudes), or national security, and these are not 
often regarded as overlapping topics. The present research proposes that these two 
domains can in fact be linked via the concept of psychological threat.  Previous research 
has demonstrated that when feeling psychologically threatened, people’s attitudes may 
become more oriented toward defensiveness. This defensiveness can “cross” domains: 
for instance, when threatened with economic uncertainty, people can become more 
punitive toward criminals (Sales, 1973).  The present study predicts that the salience of 
secularism functions as a threat to a subset of the population (i.e., religious 
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fundamentalists), and that the activation of this threat can arouse “defensive” attitudes in 
the national security domain.  
 Before addressing the research on threat, it is important to define some terms – 
namely, authoritarianism and fundamentalism – and to situate this project among research 
on these topics.  
Authoritarianism 
In this study, “authoritarianism” will reflect Altemeyer’s construct of Right Wing 
Authoritarianism (RWA), which is defined by three key tendencies: a) willing submission 
to traditional authorities; b) conventionalism; and c) hostility to norm-defying cultural 
“outsiders” (1981).  The term “authoritarian” refers more to those who willingly submit to 
traditional authority, rather than to those who would conspire to be authoritarian 
dictators (that tendency is reflected by the construct of “social dominators” (Sidanius & 
Pratto, 1999)). Authoritarians value conformity and the status quo. They may be 
aggressive, but this aggression is only directed against those who are “lower” in 
established social hierarchies. This tendency has been treated as a personality variable 
that is relatively stable and present across cultures (Krauss, Hood, Streib, Keller & Silver, 
2006). While the construct has been dubbed “right wing” authoritarianism, and in the 
United States does correlate with conservative attitudes (Altemeyer, 1996), it could also 
manifest as rigid submission to left-wing authorities (such as in communist dictatorships). 
 Religious fundamentalism has been described as authoritarianism in the religious 
domain (Altemeyer, 1996). Authoritarianism therefore provides an important link 
between fundamentalism and psychological reactions to threat. The threat-
authoritarianism link has been extensively studied – certainly more than the specific 
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threat-fundamentalism link. By recognizing fundamentalism as a subtype of 
authoritarianism, it is possible to apply the threat-authoritarianism literature to 
understanding fundamentalist attitudes.  
Religious Fundamentalism 
“Religious fundamentalism” can refer to at least three things: self-identified 
fundamentalism, historical Fundamentalism, and fundamentalism as a meta-belief. This 
study focuses on the latter: fundamentalism as a belief about one’s own religious belief. 
Providing the basis for much subsequent work, Altemeyer & Hunsberger (1992) defined 
religious fundamentalism as: “the belief that there is one set of religious teachings that 
clearly contains the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity 
and deity; that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by forces of evil which must 
be vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed today according to the 
fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past; and that those who believe and follow 
these fundamental teachings have a special relationship with the deity” (p. 118).  
Fundamentalism therefore represents a “black-and-white” attitude toward religion and 
morality, and a firm conviction that one’s own beliefs constitute the “one true path.”  The 
fundamentalism of interest in the present experiment, as in many other social 
psychological studies of the subject (e.g. Galen, Smith, Knapp & Wyngarden, 2011; 
Rothschild, Abdollahi, & Pyszczynski, 2009), is less an ideology than an approach to 
ideology. This is consistent with the conceptualization of religious fundamentalism as a 
manifestation of authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996).  This definition of fundamentalism 
treats it as a continuous variable that can be measured by Altemeyer & Hunsberger's 
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Revised Religious Fundamentalism Scale (2004), rather than as a binary matter of self-
identity. 
 This definition must be distinguished from religious self-identity as a 
fundamentalist. The “Religion and Daily Life” survey by the Pew Research Center’s 
Forum on Religion and Public Life (2011) suggests that less than 1% of the US adult 
population identifies as “fundamentalist.” But the present experiment, as with others that 
measure fundamentalism as a meta-belief, approaches fundamentalism in a way that is 
not confined to a particular denomination, or even to Christianity (Altemeyer & 
Hunsberger, 1992). While only a small percentage of the US population identifies as 
fundamentalist, many more show signs indicative of what psychologists consider 
fundamentalism. For instance, a 2010 Gallup poll revealed 40% of Americans agreed 
with the statement, “God created human beings pretty much in their present form at one 
time within the last 10,000 years or so” (as opposed to a statement endorsing 
evolutionary theory), indicating widespread scriptural literalism. Even more indicative of 
Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s definition of religious fundamentalism, in 2008, 29% of 
religiously-affiliated Americans stated that their religion was the “one true faith” 
(notably, this percentage grew from 20% in 2002) (Pew Forum on Religion and Public 
Life, 2008). Among White Evangelicals, the proportion endorsing the “one true faith” 
statement was 49% (an increase from 39% in 2002) (Pew, 2008).  
“Fundamentalism” may also refer to a historical movement associated with the 
early 20th-century United States. Fundamentalism arose as a Protestant movement to 
promote “the Fundamentals,” in response to what some viewed as threats to Christian 
morals. Perceived threats included a) the Modernist tendency to view the Bible “in 
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context” of the time it was written, rather than literally; and b) Darwinism (Kee, Albu, 
Lindberg, Frost, & Robert, 1998). While the historical definition is clearly not the subject 
of this study, it is helpful for contextualizing the beliefs of contemporary fundamentalists. 
Notably, the fundamentalists of a century ago perceived these facts to be threats: a) that 
some individuals were straying from “old-fashioned” fundamental beliefs; and b) public 
policy was favoring secularist ideals over fundamental religious ones.  The present study 
will test whether these circumstances still represent potent instigators for those who 
measure high in trait fundamentalism.  
As noted above, fundamentalism has been described as a manifestation of 
authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996). Fundamentalism and authoritarianism scales tend to 
produce correlations of around .70 (Altemeyer, 1996; Hunsberger, 1995). One cross-
cultural study comparing the personality dimensions of fundamentalists versus 
authoritarians in the US, Romania and Germany found no personality dimensions that 
correlated more strongly with fundamentalism than authoritarianism (Krauss et al., 2006). 
Because religious fundamentalism is a form of authoritarianism, I will not attempt to 
demonstrate effects of religious fundamentalism statistically “unique from” or “above 
and beyond” authoritarianism. Rather, religious fundamentalism is simply the domain-
specific form of authoritarianism that is of interest in the case of “secularism salience” 
effects.  
Threat and Authoritarianism 
Sales (1973) used archival data to demonstrate that economic threat (the Great 
Depression) positively correlated with more authoritarian behaviors in society, when 
compared to a more economically stable time period. Theoretically, the instability in the 
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economic environment provoked the more authoritarian behavior: greater support for the 
police, more punitive sentencing for sexual crimes, more aggression in literature, more 
conversions to authoritarian churches, and so on. Doty, Peterson and Winter (1991) 
compared the economically depressed era of 1978-1982 to the more economically stable 
period of 1983-1987. Reflecting Sales’ 1973 study, the authors found significant 
decreases in markers of authoritarianism (popularity of boxing, number of executions, 
preference for tough dog breeds, etc.) as the country became more economically stable. 
These apparent authoritarian reactions do not logically diffuse the threat of 
economic instability. What could doling out harsher sentences to prostitutes do to resolve 
economic uncertainty? More recent research has pointed to different models that can 
explain the link between threat and more authoritarian attitudes: the Authoritarian 
Dynamic Theory (Stenner, 2005), Terror Management Theory (e.g. Greenberg et al., 
1990), and other motivational theories of conservatism (Jost et al., 2003). The next 
section of this proposal will provide a brief overview of these theories and how they 
relate perceived threat to authoritarian behavior.  
Authoritarian Dynamic Theory  
Feldman and Stenner (1997) argue for an interactionist approach to the threat-
authoritarianism link. Previous research has suggested that transient threat increases the 
general level of authoritarianism in the public (e.g. Sales, 1973; Doty, Peterson & Winter, 
1991). But this view is hard to reconcile with a personality approach, which construes 
authoritarianism as a stable personal trait (Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 1981). Feldman 
and Stenner resolve this apparent contradiction by suggesting there is an interaction 
between the authoritarian disposition (as a personality variable) and the presence of threat 
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(a situational context). Only those who are predisposed to authoritarianism will react to 
threat with the “authoritarian” behavior (e.g. ethnocentrism, punitiveness, etc.). Those 
who are not predisposed to authoritarianism (“low-authoritarians”) will not behave this 
way. This theory predicts that authoritarians and non-authoritarians have more similar 
attitudes under neutral conditions, but diverge during threatening times. Under this 
framework, the aggregate effects observed by Sales (1973), and Doty, Peterson and 
Winter (1991) was the result of provoking the authoritarians, not a general increase in 
authoritarianism in general. Stenner describes this as the authoritarian dynamic theory 
(2005).  
 According to Stenner’s authoritarian dynamic theory (2005), those who are 
“libertarian” (liberal, value diversity and uniqueness) react in an opposite way to those 
who are “authoritarian” (which she defines as “preference for uniformity and insistence 
upon group authority” (p. 15)). In a 1997 study, Feldman and Stenner used National 
Election Survey (NES) data to compare the reactions to threat of those predisposed to 
authoritarianism against those who were not. They hypothesized that those who were 
high in authoritarianism would endorse more authoritarian behaviors when threatened 
than when unthreatened, while those low in authoritarianism (“libertarians”) would not 
differ across conditions. While the first hypothesis was confirmed by the data, the second 
was somewhat surprising. Under conditions of threat, “libertarians” became even more 
liberal in their views, across several measures: ethnocentrism, punitiveness, and so on.  
Therefore, threat had a polarizing effect on attitudes. In control conditions, the 
attitudes of authoritarians and non-authoritarians were more similar than under the 
condition of threat. The authors note that this interaction pattern reflects findings in a 
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classic terror management experiment (Greenberg et al., 1990), in which low-
authoritarians liked an outgroup member more under conditions of threat (while high-
authoritarians liked the outgroup member less) than in the control condition.  
Terror Management Theory  
Terror management theory (TMT) posits that much human behavior is organized 
around managing death-related anxiety (e.g. Greenberg et al., 1997). As humans, we have 
the unique ability to foresee and contemplate our own eventual death. From the 
perspective of terror management theorists, this knowledge contradicts our fundamental 
instinct for survival, and puts us at risk of experiencing grave anxiety. One primary 
hypothesis within TMT is that cultural worldviews, like patriotism or religious devotion, 
serve as “anxiety buffers.” Dedication to groups and values larger than the self can 
replace the fear of personal mortality with the assurance of continued, meaningful 
existence through group membership (Greenberg, Arndt, Schimel, Pyszczynski, & 
Solomon, 2001; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt & Schimel, 2004).  
 The TMT literature has explicitly identified religious fundamentalism as an 
“anxiety buffer” (Friedman and Rholes, 2008). The “anxiety buffer hypothesis” states 
that when a buffer is directly undermined (perhaps by priming the weakness of one’s 
country or culture), death-related thoughts will become more accessible. Friedman and 
Rholes (2008) showed that, when reminded of their own mortality, religious 
fundamentalists were less likely to engage in secular “worldview-defense” than non-
fundamentalists were. The authors suggested that the religious belief created enough of a 
protection against anxiety that fundamentalists did not resort to other defensive 
techniques. In another study, Friedman and Rholes (2007) exposed Christian students to 
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texts that demonstrated inconsistencies in Biblical accounts of Christ’s resurrection. 
Students were also measured on their degree of fundamentalism, through the use of 
Altemeyer & Hunsberger’s Religious Fundamentalism scale (1992). “High 
fundamentalists” (those who scored high on the scale), but not “low fundamentalists,” 
reacted to the “inconsistencies” condition with greater death-thought accessibility 
(“DTA”, as measured by a word-completion task). The increased DTA provides evidence 
that the death-thought-suppressing “buffer” – namely, belief in the literal text of the Bible 
– had been eroded. Neither high nor low fundamentalists demonstrated greater than 
average death-thought accessibility in the control text condition, which also had religious 
(though not challenging-to-religion) content. This study provides the most direct 
evidence of fundamentalists using literal Biblical interpretations as an anxiety buffer.   
TMT theorists also argue that when a person’s defenses against mortality thoughts 
are eroded, he or she can become more ethnocentric and aggressive (McGregor et al., 
1998). This suggests a mechanism whereby certain ideas, if they challenge comforting 
worldviews, can lead to more authoritarian behavior. In the present case, it may be that 
secularism erodes the fundamentalists’ “buffer” against mortality thoughts, thus leading 
to endorsement of more aggressive policies.  
Need for Closure, Need for Certainty, and Other Motives  
 Several theorists have proposed that authoritarian behavior stems from the threat 
of uncertainty. Fromm (1941) argued precisely this, noting that historical movements to 
gain freedom from oppression often resulted in a relapse towards authoritarian rule. He 
argued that freedom implies uncertainty, and the threat of this uncertainty can provoke a 
psychological need for a strong leader and for social conformity.  Rokeach was another 
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early proponent of this general theory, drawing correlations between anxiety and 
dogmatism (1960). 
Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski and Sulloway summarized a great deal of such theory and 
research, drawing connections between authoritarian beliefs and psychological motives in 
a meta-analysis (2003). They argued that certain social-cognitive motives drive 
conservative beliefs; that is, while conservative beliefs may be rational, principled, and/or 
learned, they also “match” with certain psychological motivations. Noting that 
ideological beliefs are squarely in a “hot cognitive” domain, they survey research that has 
connected conservative attitudes to underlying cognitive motives.  For example, Wilson 
(1973) argued that certain responses, including religious dogmatism and militarism, were 
a result of a need to deal with uncertainty in the environment. To Wilson, environmental 
uncertainty included the presence of foreigners or dissenters, as well as social change in 
general. Other research they reviewed focused directly on motivational processes that 
drive people toward certain types of cognition. For instance, a need for closure (whether 
dispositional or situationally manipulated), is associated with “seizing” upon a 
comforting conclusion, and a reluctance to change this conclusion. This can result in a 
preference for ideological content that promises a lack of ambiguity. As conservatism is 
comprised of attitudes that both resist change and reinforce social hierarchies (Jost et al., 
2003), conservatism can represent the ideology of “certainty” rather than ambiguity. In 
support of this conclusion, using meta-analysis, the authors found that uncertainty 
tolerance was negatively associated with conservatism (r = -.27), and need for order, 
structure, and closure was positively associated with conservatism (r = .26). In the 
present study, such a motivational-ideological link supports the hypothesis that 
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politically-charged information can shift even irrelevant attitudes. If the “secularism” 
condition poses a threat to certainty, a motive may be activated towards more 
“conservative” attitudes, including endorsement of militarism.   
The present research will not test mediation via any of the above mentioned 
processes. If the predicted effects are found, follow-up studies measuring death-thought 
accessibility, need for closure, etc., might help illuminate specific processes. For present 
purposes, these models merely demonstrate the psychological “reasonableness” of the 
proposed study, and situate it among relevant research.  
The Present Threat: Secularism 
 The “threat” in question in this proposal is secularism, a construct with multiple 
definitions. Philosophical secularism is akin to atheism or agnosticism, “a godless system 
of the world” (McClay, 2007). Political secularism refers the separation between the 
political realm and the religious realm. The United States, for instance, generally protects 
state secularism, with the ideal of a “separation of church and state.” The First 
Amendment to the Constitution forbids the establishment of a state religion, for instance. 
State secularism provides a “bi-directional” buffer between the state and religious 
entities. The state cannot interfere with religious groups, and neither can religious groups 
dictate government policy. The United States is not, however, saturated with 
“philosophical secularism”: approximately 78% of Americans believe in God, and an 
additional 15% believe in a higher spirit (Newport, 2008).  
 One impetus for the present study is that the “influence of secularism” was the 
top-rated “threat to Evangelical Christianity” named by Protestant Evangelical leaders in 
a recent Pew Research Center poll (2011). The poll did not specify which definition of 
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“secularism” this was referring to: growing atheism, church-state separation, or some 
other dimension of the construct. Therefore, this study will take a general approach to 
studying the “secularist threat.” That is, the stimulus will be relevant to both of these 
dimensions: rising atheism, and a lack of fundamentalist dominance in politics. 
It is conceivable that both political and philosophical secularism could constitute 
a threat to fundamentalists. Rising atheism may be seen as evidence of the fallibility or 
wrongness of religious beliefs, due to a lack of consensus. For example, terror 
management theorists have explained anxiety-buffering cultural worldviews as 
“essentially socially constructed fictions” that require “constant social validation” 
(Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski & Lyon, 1989, p. 683). Therefore, 
evidence of the popularity of philosophical secularism (“godlessness”) may temporarily 
undermine the social validation the worldview requires. Indeed, whether addressing 
secular or religious anxiety buffers, several studies have demonstrated an increase in 
death-thought accessibility after the worldview was challenged (Schimel, Hayes, 
Williams & Jahrig, 2007).  
Political secularism speaks to the inability of religion to control behavior on a 
large scale (failure of religious authority). The desire for religious doctrine to be inserted 
into public governance appears to be of particular concern for fundamentalists. One 
reason is that if fundamentalism is itself “a religious manifestation of right-wing 
authoritarianism” (Altemeyer, 1996, p. 116), it should also manifest partially as an 
attraction to authority, rather than to freedom and tolerance. Therefore, there should be an 
attraction on the part of fundamentalists to law that asserts scriptural authority, rather 
than promotes ideological freedom. It is plausible that the secularist threat may relate to 
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the failure of both authorities (religion and state) to reaffirm the same “laws,” especially 
because submission to authority is a primary dimension of authoritarian personality 
(Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). If the authorities fail to reach consensus, this 
undermines the worldview-buffering abilities of both church and state.  
Counter-Terrorism Attitudes as a Dependent Variable 
Attitude towards aggressive counterterrorism policies is a common outcome 
variable in the psychological study of authoritarianism, terror management, and 
fundamentalism. This focus is unsurprising, given that measures such as waterboarding 
detainees, wiretapping citizens, and using unmanned drones to kill targets are among the 
most controversial and salient political issues of the past decade. Some of these expanded 
government powers in relation to counterterrorism have spanned both the Bush and 
Obama administrations, suggesting that their endorsement is more complex than simple 
party identification.  
Interest in aggressive counterterrorism attitudes has inspired a number of studies 
in social psychological literature. Landau et al. (2004) measured attitudes towards George 
W. Bush and his counterterrorist policies following mortality salience and 9/11-priming 
manipulations. Participants rated their agreement with a passage that included lines such 
as, “I appreciate our President’s wisdom regarding the need to remove Saddam Hussein 
from power and his Homeland Security Policy is a source of great comfort to me,” and “I 
endorse the actions of President Bush and the members of his administration who have 
taken bold action in Iraq” (p. 1440).  They found that agreement with this passage 
increased when participants were primed with either their own mortality, or the events of 
9/11. Pyszczynski et al. (2006) investigated the related effects of mortality salience on 
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endorsement of violence among both Iranians and Americans (towards each other). Their 
experiments revealed that Americans were more likely to endorse “extreme military 
measures” (with items such as “If we could capture or kill Osama bin Laden we should 
do it, even if thousands of civilians are injured or killed in the process” (p. 531)) when 
primed with mortality (vs. control).  
Barnes, Brown and Osterman (2012) examined a different predictor of aggressive 
military responses: masculine honor ideology. Men studying in the southern United 
States, a region associated with a “culture of honor” (Cohen, 1998), were more likely to 
endorse “extreme counterterrorism measures” than their northern counterparts. This 
“honor ideology” effect persisted even when controlling for patriotism and religiosity. 
The present study will borrow many “extreme counterterrorism” items from Barnes et al. 
(2012).     
Research Connecting Fundamentalism to Counterterrorism Attitudes  
Several studies have measured religious fundamentalism (often referred to as 
“RF”) as a predictor of extreme counterterrorist (or aggressive military) attitudes. The 
Barnes, Brown and Osterman (2012) article, for instance, measured RF, among other 
constructs, as covariates in their search for the honor ideology effects described above. 
They found that RF was significantly positively correlated with support for “severe” 
interrogations of terrorists (r = .19, p <.05) and aggressive counterterrorist military action 
(e.g., preemptive attacks; r = .28, p <.01). However, when entered into a regression 
model, RF failed to significantly predict any of these attitudes.   
A study by Henderson-King et al. (2004) examined some predictors of various 
responses to terrorism, ranging from sending aid to Afghanistan and seeking 
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understanding, to attacking enemies with brutal force. Echoing the more recent Barnes et 
al. article (2012), religious fundamentalism (RF) was found to correlate positively with 
endorsement of increased domestic surveillance (r = .12, p <.01) and the use of military 
force against Afghanistan (r = .14, p <.01). RF was negatively correlated with the 
impetus to “seek understanding” of the terrorist’s grievances (r = -.17, p <.001)1. These 
effects reflected the directionality of RWA’s zero-order correlations with the same 
dependent variables. It is likely that the effects of RF were “driven” by the RWA 
component of RF. When controlling for RWA, RF was not a significant predictor – and 
even became a negative predictor – of the “aggressive” dependent variables.  
Relevant to the present study, Rothschild, Abdollahi and Pyszczynski (2009) 
measured a three-way interaction between religious fundamentalism, mortality salience, 
and the priming of compassionate religious values. Their dependent variable was attitude 
toward the use of “extreme military interventions” (816). The authors drew from the 
“dual-component” conceptualization of RF (Laythe et al., 2001), which describes RF as 
possessing both an authoritarian structure and religious content. The religious content 
component (“treat thy neighbor as thyself”) may conflict with the authoritarian impetus 
(hostility toward outgroups). The authors hypothesized that RF could therefore decrease 
aggressive attitudes, if the compassionate religious component were primed, particularly 
under a mortality threat. They found that RF generally predicted greater endorsement of 
aggressive military techniques. The main effect of RF disappeared, however, when 
fundamentalists were primed with both mortality salience and the compassionate 
                                                          
1 RF did not significantly correlate with the other two dependent variables in this study, “attack terrorists” 
and “aid.”  
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dimension of their religion. Under such conditions, “high-fundamentalists” were no 
different from “low-fundamentalists” in their support for these policies.  
The Present Study 
 Many of the studies described above measured both religious fundamentalism and 
authoritarianism as they relate to counterterrorist or military attitudes. Again and again, 
the effect of religious fundamentalism was eliminated when controlling for RWA. 
Therefore it may be tempting to dismiss the effect of RF on counterterrorism attitudes, as 
the effects are apparently “redundant” with generic authoritarianism.  
While I expect fundamentalism to correlate highly with authoritarianism, I believe 
fundamentalism is the more relevant construct for the present study. Fundamentalism 
presents an interesting domain-specific “case” of authoritarianism. It is well-established 
that environmental threat engenders more aggression and out-group derogation among 
authoritarians (e.g. Feldman and Stenner, 1997). But what represents a threat to those 
high in RF may not be a threat to less religious authoritarians.  Pointing out 
contradictions in the Bible, for instance, was sufficient to increase the accessibility of 
death-related thoughts among religious fundamentalists (Friedman & Rholes, 2007). In 
another study, a strong argument against creationism had a similar effect (Schimel et al., 
2007). The present study will echo this research, but slightly shift the nature of the 
stimulus: rather than challenging the truthfulness of the sacred text, it will challenge the 
social validation of the religious belief.  
Challenges to the “social validation” of religious belief are likely to be frequent 
occurrences for fundamentalists -- probably more frequent than direct arguments against 
scripture. For instance, any information that same-sex marriage is gaining acceptance 
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across the US can function as a challenge to the social validation of fundamentalist 
ideals. And such discussions are frequent in the political domain. Many salient “culture 
war” issues relate directly to the government enforcement of scripturally-informed 
policies. Pat Buchanan helped define these “culture war” issues in a famous speech at the 
1992 Republican National Convention:   
The agenda [Bill] Clinton and [Hillary] Clinton would impose on America 
— abortion on demand, a litmus test for the Supreme Court, homosexual 
rights, discrimination against religious schools, women in combat — that's 
change, all right. But it is not the kind of change America wants. It is not 
the kind of change America needs. And it is not the kind of change we can 
tolerate in a nation that we still call God's country. 
 
While this speech was over 20 years ago, the themes of abortion, gay rights, women’s 
rights, and “religious freedom” still play a central role in national politics. The 2012 
Republican Party platform still argued for the primacy of heterosexual marriage and 
opposition to abortion (Republican Party platform of 2012, n.d.) The discourse also 
shifted towards emphasizing “religious freedom” in general. The campaign for 
Republican candidate Mitt Romney emphasized the “threat” that an Obama 
administration would pose to religious Christians. A “robo-call” made by the campaign 
stated,  
Remember when Obama forced Christian organizations to provide 
insurance coverage that was contrary to their religious beliefs? That's the 
real Barack Obama. That's the real threat to our religious freedom. Mitt 
Romney understands the importance of faith and family. That's why so 
many leaders of the Christian community are supporting Romney. They 
know we can't underestimate the threat Barack Obama poses to our faith, 
our values, our freedom (as cited in Terkel, 2012).  
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We can see from this rhetoric2 that religion is perceived as both politically-relevant and 
vulnerable. Being confronted with American secularization is not likely to be a rare 
occurrence for religious fundamentalists.   
To summarize, research shows that fundamentalists are authoritarian; secularism 
threatens fundamentalists; and threat activates more aggressive attitudes among 
authoritarians. If these effects are reflected in the present study, we may see the curious, 
domain-crossing effect of social information on national security attitudes.  
It should be noted that calling policies “aggressive”, “militant” or “extreme” is 
necessarily subjective.  The events of September 11, 2001 demonstrated that for 
Americans, the threat of death from acts of terrorism is real. There is no objective 
standard dictating the way to balance Americans’ safety with civil liberties, or the rights 
of suspected enemies. None of the items on the present dependent measure (see Appendix 
B; items such as “If necessary, the United States should use nuclear weapons to defend its 
interests against those of terrorists”) are intrinsically wrong. All of the items represent 
controversial issue positions, that when endorsed, represent a more “aggressive” policies 
or a more “interventionist” role of the government and military in addressing terrorism. 
Since these policies (such as war; use of nuclear weapons; use of severe interrogations) 
have the potential to inflict massive harm, how citizens arrive at their stances on these is 
of great importance.  
 
                                                          
2 Notably, the perceived threat here was not that individuals would be prevented from practicing their 
religion. The threat is that employers would be prevented from using their religious beliefs to restrict birth 
control coverage to their employees. This example illustrates that the “threat to religious freedom” may 
actually be a “threat to the free authoritarian exercise of religion.” 
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Additional Variables Potentially Associated with Counter-Terrorism Attitudes 
Political expertise.  I measured political expertise as a potential moderator of the 
two-way fundamentalism by secularism-prime interaction. There are two ways that 
expertise could moderate the effect that the priming condition has on fundamentalists’ 
attitudes. The first relates to the classic idea in political psychology that only those who 
are “experts” in politics organize their attitudes in an ideological (“constrained”) fashion, 
while political novices have less ideologically-organized attitudes (Converse 1964; Judd 
and Krosnick 1989; Goren 1997). Experts’ attitudes should be more consistent with 
ideology across domains, and they may be more likely to interpret information in an 
ideological manner. According to this line of thought, the pattern of the secularism prime 
influencing fundamentalists, but not non-fundamentalists, may only emerge for those 
high in political expertise (thus, a three-way interaction). In this case, only high-
fundamentalists who are also high in political expertise should interpret the secularism 
stimulus as a threat to conservative ideals, and thus react with “exaggerated 
conservatism” on the counterterrorism measure (i.e. more punitive, aggressive 
responses).  High-fundamentalists who are low in political expertise would not differ 
between conditions with regard to the DV. In sum, this concept suggests that attitude 
change as brought about by secularism prime would require both a) religious 
fundamentalism, and b) political expertise. If this pattern emerges, this would suggest 
that effect of secularist threat on the DV is related to ideological processing rather than 
more basic processes (i.e. threat perception and outgroup aggression).  
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An alternate prediction would follow from research suggesting experts have more 
crystallized prior attitudes than novices do (e.g. Cacioppo et al., 1992). If this effect 
influences the present research, then the priming condition should not sway experts (of 
any level of fundamentalism) as much as it does novices. This would suggest a three-way 
interaction, with the proposed two-way interaction occurring for novices but not for 
experts. This is the opposite prediction to what is proposed in the previous paragraph.  
Gender. Gender has been shown to significantly predict counterterrorism 
responses (Henderson-King et al., 2004). In the Henderson-King et al. study, women 
were more likely than men to endorse both attacking terrorists and sending aid to 
Afghanistan, even when controlling for ideology and worldviews. I therefore measured 
gender as a potential control.  
Hypotheses 
 This study proposes two main hypotheses (1 and 2), and three competing 
hypotheses regarding moderation (3a, 3b and 3c):  
1) Religious fundamentalism will positively predict endorsement of militant 
counterterrorism policies (main effect of RF).  
2) High fundamentalists3 primed with an article describing “secularization in the United 
States” will endorse extreme counterterrorism policies more than those who read a 
control article. Low fundamentalists will not differ between the two conditions (two-way 
interaction).   
                                                          
3 Using regression with interaction terms, “high-fundamentalism” will be represent fundamentalism 1 
standard deviation above the mean on the Revised RF Scale. “Low-fundamentalism” will represent scores 1 
standard deviation below the mean. The same procedure will be used for political expertise.  
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3a) The two-way fundamentalism by secularism-threat interaction will only emerge for       
those high in political expertise (three-way interaction).  
3b) The two-way fundamentalism by secularism-threat interaction will only emerge for   
those low in political expertise (three-way interaction).  
3c) The fundamentalism by secularism threat interaction will be equal across levels of   
political expertise (absence of three-way interaction).  
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CHAPTER TWO 
METHODS AND PROCEDURE 
Participants 
For this study, I recruited 250 participants online via amazon.com’s Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk). Because the dependent variable in this study is political in nature, and I 
was primarily interested in the American political climate, I wanted to obtain a sample 
that was as reflective of the US population as possible. While not completely 
representative, samples pulled from MTurk have been demonstrated to be more reflective 
of the US population than typical student samples (Berinsky, Huber & Lenz, 2011). In 
order to make impactful conclusions in the political realm, obtaining diversity in age, 
race, political orientation and geographical region of subjects is important. Via MTurk, I 
hoped to obtain a sample inclusive of a broad range of levels of religious 
fundamentalism.  
There is some precedence for using North American convenience samples to find 
variance in levels of fundamentalism (Friedman & Rholes, 2007; Friedman & Rholes, 
2008; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Galen, Smith, Knapp & Wyngarden, 2011; Galen 
& Miller, 2011). Typically, these studies have involved university student samples in the 
US and Canada (Altemeyer & Hunsberger’s 1992 study also surveyed university 
students’ parents). Notably, one recent study on fundamentalism, right-wing 
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authoritarianism and prejudice used MTurk for recruitment, and successfully found a 
range of fundamentalism (Johnson, Labouff, Rowatt, Patock-Peckham & Carlisle, 2012).  
Procedure 
I posted the contents of the survey to MTurk, where participants were offered 
$0.40 for participating in a “study on personality and verbal task performance.” The task 
was limited to participants in the United States (as determined by IP address).  
After providing their worker ID and agreeing to participate in the survey, 
participants were directed to the experiment hosted by SNAP. Via SNAP, participants 
were randomly signed to one of two conditions: “secular” and “control.”  
In both conditions, subjects were first presented with an introduction that briefly 
outlined the contents of the survey. The instructions included the suggestion that the 
experiment constitutes a test of verbal comprehension. The subjects were informed that 
the survey would involve some personality and attitude measures and handful of brief 
written tasks, and should take no longer than 30 minutes to complete.  
Next, participants were be asked to complete a political expertise measure (5 
items measuring political knowledge), the RF short scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 
2004) two questions relating to their interest in reading, and to provide their gender, party 
identification and ideological orientation (see “Materials” section below). These each 
appeared as questions on a sequence of web pages as the participant moved through the 
experiment. After completing the questions, the participants were informed that they 
would be shown two articles. The instructions stated that the participant will be asked to 
briefly summarize the articles after reading them. This was to facilitate greater attention 
to the article's content.  
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Following instructions, the participants were shown an article about major league 
soccer. This constituted a “filler task” to create some distance between the independent 
variable measurements, and the stimulus and dependent variable. After reading the soccer 
article, participants clicked “next,” and were prompted to briefly summarize the article.  
Next, those assigned to the experimental condition were asked to read an article 
entitled “Secularism in the United States.” This material is an adaptation of an article 
from The Advocate (UK) on rising atheism as a self-identity in the United States, as well 
as a drifting away from fundamentalist social mores and policies (Harris, 2011). While it 
had been altered to remove certain irrelevant and contradictory elements, it was presented 
as though it were a newspaper article in its original form. This is the text of the article:  
The United States is often portrayed as a very religious country. Yet in the 
homeland of many visibly religious celebrities and politicians, atheists are 
actually part of one of the fastest-growing groups in the US: the godless. The 
number of atheists, who do not believe in God, and agnostics, who also claim no 
particular faith, is on the rise. The US is quickly becoming a more secular – that 
is, less religious - country, some experts say. “It has never been better to be a free-
thinker or agnostic in America,” says Annie Laurie Gaylor, co-president of the 
Freedom from Religion Foundation.  
Atheism is one of the fastest-growing major “religious” demographics in 
the country. The proportion of people calling themselves atheists has increased 
fivefold over the past seven years, according to a recent WIN-Gallup poll.   
Professor Barry Kosmin of Trinity College, who conducts the national 
Religious Identification Survey, believes up to a quarter of young people in the 
US have no specific faith, and scoffs at the idea that the country is highly 
religious or becoming more so. “The trend in American history is away from 
religion,” Kosmin said.  
Kosmin cites social trends as evidence of the changing face of the country. 
Many Americans are now choosing to get married without any form of religious 
ceremony, for example. At universities, departments devoted to the study of 
secularism are starting to appear. Books by atheist authors are bestsellers. 
National groups, such as the Secular Coalition of America (SCA), have opened 
branches across the country.  
There is little doubt that religious groups still wield some influence in US 
politics and public life. Yet Kosmin said the attention paid by politicians and the 
media to religious groups is not necessarily a sign of strength. “When religion was 
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doing well, it did not need to go into politics. Atheism in our culture is obviously 
growing and so religion is on the defensive,” he said.  
So far, only one member of Congress, Californian Democrat Pete Stark, 
has publicly stated that he does not believe in God. “Privately, we know that there 
are 27 members of Congress that have no belief in God. But we don’t ‘out’ 
people,” said a representative of the SCA. 
Many experts think that one day it will become politically mainstream to 
confess to a lack of faith, as US political life lags behind the society that it 
represents. “Politicians are just starting to catch up to the changing demographics 
of our society,” said Gaylor.  
 
 Those assigned to the control condition read an article on the topic of low-calorie 
restaurant menus (see Appendix A). The control article was taken from examiner.com, 
and approximately reflects the language, difficulty, and length of the stimulus article, 
without the reactive content.  
Again, participants were asked to provide a brief summary of the previous article. 
This was used as a manipulation check (data from participants whose summary failed to 
reflect the content of the article whatsoever were excluded from analysis). Following this, 
the participants were asked to fill out the dependent variable measure, the support for 
militant counterterrorism policies scale.  
After the participants completed these tasks, they were debriefed, with my contact 
information provided. Participants were then asked to create a 4-digit code, which they 
typed into a box in the SNAP survey. They were then asked to submit this code on the 
MTurk interface, which qualified them to receive payment. All participants were paid 
$0.40 via MTurk within 24 hours of submitting their responses.  
Measured Variables 
Independent Variable: Trait Fundamentalism 
Trait fundamentalism was measured with Altemeyer’s and Hunsberger’s Revised 
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Religious Fundamentalism scale (2004). This 12-item scale was developed in order to 
shorten and refine the original 20-item Religious Fundamentalism scale published by 
same authors in 1992. When describing the impetus for designing the new scale, 
Altemeyer and Hunsberger stated that the original 20-item scale overemphasized the 
adherence to “one true religion” aspect of religious fundamentalism. The Revised scale 
removes the bias towards this dimension, with several items removed and others 
rephrased to have a broader meaning. The revised scale was found to be just as internally 
reliable as the original (over .90 alpha coefficient), and more accurately reflects the 
construct as intended (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004). I therefore found this to be the 
most appropriate measure for this experiment. 
 Potential Moderator: Political Expertise 
  Political expertise was measured with five knowledge questions relating to U.S. 
government in an open-ended format (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Fiske, Lau, & Smith, 
1990; example: “Which party currently controls the U.S. Senate?”). The answers were 
scored dichotomously as right or wrong, and the number of correct answers were used to 
estimate political expertise.   
Control Variables 
Gender. Participants were asked to state their gender. 
Party identification. Participants were asked to select their party identification 
from a drop-down menu. The options provided were Democrat, Republican, Libertarian, 
Green, Reform, Constitution, None, or Other.  
Ideology. Participants were asked to state their ideological orientation on a 7-
point scale from “Extremely Liberal” to “Extremely Conservative.”  
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Dependent Variable: Endorsement of Militant Counterterrorism Policies 
The dependent variable consisted of an eleven-item scale that measured 
endorsement of a variety of counterterrorist practices. Items for this scale were largely 
borrowed, and in some cases modified, from items used by Barnes, Brown and Osterman 
(2012) and Pyszcyznski, Abdollahi, Solomon, Greenberg, Cohen & Weise (2006). The 
questions address topics such as support for war, deportations, and severe interrogations. 
See Appendix B for the complete list of items. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESULTS 
Statistical Treatment Overview 
Except where otherwise indicated, these results were analyzed using linear 
multiple regression with interaction terms. The continuous independent variables 
(religious fundamentalism [RF], political expertise [PE], ideology [IDEO]) were centered 
by subtracting the mean from each score, and standardized by dividing scores by their 
standard deviation. Condition was effect coded such that the control condition was coded 
as -1 and secularism prime condition was coded as 1. Party identification was dummy 
coded, with “none” serving as the baseline condition. Interaction terms were created by 
multiplying the relevant scores together. 
Results were analyzed two ways: first, with no controls entered; and second with 
party identification and ideology entered as controls. For analyses without controls, 
religious fundamentalism (RF), political expertise (PE), and condition (CON) were 
entered at step 1; the two-way interactions between these variables were entered at step 2 
(RFxCON, RFxPE, PExCON); and the three-way interaction between the three variables 
(RFxPExCON) was entered at step 3. The analyses with controls were the same, except 
that party identification dummy codes1 and ideology were entered at step 1 along with the 
other variables. Following Cohen and Cohen (1983), the effects of religious
                                                          
1 Party identification was dummy coded such that four new variables were formed: Democrats (1) vs. None 
(0); Republicans (1) vs. None (0); Libertarians (1) vs. None (0); and Others (1) vs. None (0). 
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fundamentalism, political expertise and condition are tested at step 1, the two-way 
interactions are tested at step 2, and the 3-way interaction is tested at step 3. Therefore
Hypothesis 1 was tested at step 1, Hypothesis 2 was tested at step 2, and Hypothesis
3a, 3b and 3c were tested at step 3. Simple slope analyses were used to test significant 
interactions.  
Preliminary Analyses 
A total of 250 responses were collected. 29 responses were omitted due to repeat-
participation or failure on “attention-check” items. This left a sample size of 221 for 
analysis. A summary of the characteristics of this sample can be found in Table 1 and 
Table 2.  
Table 1. Descriptive Characteristics of Categorical Variables 
Gender 128 female, 93 male (57.9% female) 
Party 
Identification 
102 Democrat (46.2%) 
41 Republican (18.6%) 
18 Libertarian (8.1%) 
43 None (19.5%) 
17 Other (9 “Other”, 5 “Constitution”, 3 “Green”) (7.7%) 
Religious 
identification 
40 Christian-Protestant (18.1%) 
23 Christian-Catholic (10.4%) 
34 Christian-Other (15.4%) 
4 Jewish (1.8%) 
4 Muslim (1.8%) 
48 Atheist (21.7%) 
32 Agnostic (14.5%) 
17 No Affiliation (7.7%) 
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Table 2. Descriptive Characteristics of Continuous Variables 
 
Variable Mean  
(range: low, 
high) 
Standard Deviation Chronbach’s Alpha 
Religious 
fundamentalism (RF) 
3.32 (1,9) 2.09 .96 
Political Expertise 
(PE) 
4.05 (1,5) 1.07 .50 
Ideology (IDE) 3.21 (1,7) 2.63 n/a 
Endorsement of 
militaristic 
counterterrorism 
policies (EP) 
3.47 (1,9) 2.03 .96 
 
Reliability Analyses 
 Three multi-item measures were included in this analysis: religious 
fundamentalism, political expertise, and endorsement of militaristic counterterrorism 
policies. For these, composite scores were created by averaging the item scores. 
Reliability analyses were performed on each scale. The Revised Religious 
Fundamentalism scale was internally reliable (alpha = .96).  The dependent variable, 
endorsement of militaristic counterterrorism policies (which I will refer to as “EP” for 
“endorsement of policies”), was also quite internally reliable (alpha = .96). The political 
expertise measure was less reliable (alpha = .50). This low reliability was not unexpected, 
as this was a factual knowledge test of only five items, where each item was scored 
simply as 1 or 0 (correct vs. incorrect; M=4.05). None of the three scales’ reliability could 
be substantially improved by removing any items. Therefore, all originally-presented 
items remained in analysis. 
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Invariance of Sample between Conditions 
T-tests were performed on measured variables to determine whether the sample 
was invariant across conditions. These analyses revealed that the control and 
experimental groups did not differ with regard to ideology, level of fundamentalism, or 
level of political expertise (all Ps > .5). The groups were also equivalent in terms of 
gender and party identification (Ps > .1). Therefore, random assignment was successful in 
creating invariant samples between conditions. 
Inter-Relations between Predictor Variables 
Correlations between continuous predictors. Correlations were determined 
between the three continuous predictor variables: religious fundamentalism, ideology, 
and political expertise. The full correlation matrix is displayed in Table 3.  
Table 3: Correlations between Continuous Predictors 
 Religious 
Funda-
mentalism 
(“RF”) 
Ideology 
(larger = more 
conservative) 
Political 
Expertise 
(“PE”) 
RF 1 .495** -.272** 
Ideology  1 -.198** 
PE   1 
*p<.05, **p<.01 
Political expertise was negatively correlated with both religious fundamentalism (r= -
.272, r2=.074, p<.001) and conservative ideology (r= -.198, r2=.039, p=.003). This 
suggests that people with more political knowledge tend to be less fundamentalist and 
more liberal. The association is small (<8% of variance explained in each case), but it is 
significant. Religious fundamentalism was also positively correlated with conservative 
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ideology (r= .495, r2=.245, p<.001). This suggests that conservatives tend to be 
substantially more oriented toward fundamentalism than liberals are. 
Relationship between categorical predictors and continuous predictors. I ran 
multiple univariate ANOVAs to determine the relationship between each categorical 
variable and each continuous variable. For these analyses, a single categorical predictor 
served as the independent variable, using a single continuous variable as the DV. If 
significant differences were found at the p <.05 level, I followed up the analysis with a 
post-hoc Tukey HSD test. Any significant (p<.05) mean differences between groups are 
reported.  
Gender. Gender was determined to be unrelated to religious fundamentalism, F(1, 
219)= .096, p=.757; ideology, F(1, 219) = .307, p=.580; and political expertise F(1, 219) 
= 1.34, p=.249.  
Party identification. A univariate ANOVA was run on party identification to 
determine the relationship of party to the continuous predictors. Of the eight party options 
provided, several groups were too small for meaningful analysis. Those with N<5 (Green, 
N=3; Constitution, N=5; Reform, N=0) were combined into the “Other” category 
(original N=9; with other groups added, N=17). This reduced the number of selected 
party identifications from eight to five: Democrat, Republican, Libertarian, Other, and 
None.  
Religious fundamentalism significantly varied between parties, F(4, 216) = 8.75, 
p<.001). A follow-up Tukey HSD test determined that numerous significant differences 
existed at the p<.05 level: Republicans (M=4.74, SD=1.95) scored significantly higher on 
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the religious fundamentalism scale than did Democrats (M=2.74, SD=1.85), Libertarians 
(M=2.91, SD=1.36), and those who chose “None” as their party identification (M=3.17, 
SD=2.26). Republicans did not differ from those in the “Other” group (M=4.19, 
SD=2.25). In addition to differing from Republicans, Democrats also had significantly 
lower religious fundamentalism than did those in the “Other” group.  No other significant 
inter-party differences were found.  
Predictably, ideology also significantly varied by party identification, F(4, 216) = 
43.06, p<.001). A follow-up Tukey HSD test was run to determine what significant 
group-level differences existed. Republicans (M=5.22, SD=1.46) were significantly more 
conservative than all of the other four groups: Democrats (M=2.28, SD=0.93), 
Libertarians (M=3.72, SD=1.13), “None” (M=3.35, SD=1.40) and “Other” (M=3.00, 
SD=1.77). Additionally, Democrats were significantly less conservative than the “None” 
group and the Libertarian group, but did not significantly differ from the “Other” group. 
No other significant differences were found.  
Political expertise was also found to differ between groups, F(4, 216) = 2.94, 
p=.021). The follow-up Tukey HSD test determined that Democrats (M=4.29, SD=.88) 
scored significantly higher on the political expertise measure than did Republicans 
(M=3.68, SD=1.13). This echoes the similar negative correlation found between 
conservatism and political expertise (see Table 3). No other significant between-group 
differences were found.  
Religious identification. As with party identification, there were several religious 
groups with N<5 (Hindu, N=0; Jewish, N=4; Muslim, N=4). For this analysis, these small 
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groups were combined with the “Other” religious group (original N=9, with groups 
added, N=17).  This left eight groups for analysis: Christian (Catholic); Christian 
(Protestant); Christian (Other); Buddhist; no affiliation; atheist; agnostic, and “other.”  
Religious fundamentalism significantly varied by religious orientation, F(7, 213) 
= 31.356, p<.001. A post-hoc Tukey HSD test determined there were numerous group 
differences, so these are displayed in Table 4 below.  
Table 4: Mean Religious Fundamentalism by Religious Identification 
 
Religious Orientation N 1 2 3 
Atheist 48 1.75   
Agnostic 32 1.84   
No Affiliation 17 2.15   
Buddhist 10 2.52 2.52  
Other 17  3.60  
Christian (Catholic) 23  3.61  
Christian (Other) 34   5.01 
Christian (Protestant) 40   5.37 
Mean religious fundamentalism is displayed in columns 1, 2, and 3. Means within the 
same column do no significantly differ. Means each column significantly differ from 
means in other columns (with the exception of the Buddhist category, which differs only 
from the means in Column 3).  
 
As displayed in Table 4, three significantly differing groups emerged: a “low 
fundamentalism” group (column 1) consisting of atheists, agnostics, those with no 
affiliation, and Buddhists; a “moderate fundamentalism” group consisting of Buddhists, 
Catholics, and those with “Other” religious identity, and a “high fundamentalism” group 
(column 3) that consists of Protestant Christians and those who identified with “Christian 
(Other).” 
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Ideology also significantly differed by religious identity, F(7, 213) = 7.527, 
p<.001. Protestant Christians were significantly more conservative (M=4.23, SD=1.72) 
than those with no religious affiliation (M=2.35, SD=1.41), atheists (M=2.31, SD=1.22), 
and agnostics (M=2.84, SD=1.42). Atheists were also significantly less conservative than 
Catholic Christians (M=3.57, SD=1.44), and “other” Christians (M=3.88, SD=1.67). No 
other between-religion differences in ideology were found. 
Finally, political expertise was determined to significantly vary by religion, F(7, 
213) = 2.676, p=.011. The only significant between-group difference was that atheists 
(M=4.39, SD=.75) displayed higher political expertise than “Other Christians” (M=3.59, 
SD=1.50). No other groups significantly differed in political expertise.  
Condition. Religious fundamentalism did not differ by condition, F(1, 219) <.001, 
p=.993. Condition was also unrelated to ideology, F(1, 219) = .109, p=.74; and political 
expertise F(1, 219) = .391, p=.533.  
Bivariate Relations between Each Predictor and the Dependent Measure 
Continuous predictors and the dependent measure. Each of the three 
continuous predictors was significantly related to the dependent measure, support for 
militant counterterrorism policies (“EP”). Conservative ideology was positively 
associated with EP, r(219)= .475, r2=.226, p<.001, while political expertise correlated 
negatively with EP, r(219)= -.212, r2=.045, p=.002. Lending preliminary support to 
Hypothesis 1, religious fundamentalism was positively correlated with the dependent 
variable, r(219)= .370, r2=.137, p<.001.  
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Categorical predictors and the dependent measure.  
Gender. Gender was unrelated to EP, F(1, 219) = .469, p= .494. Because of its 
non-effects on the dependent measure and other relevant variables, it is not included in 
subsequent regression analyses. 
Party. Responses to the dependent measure significantly varied by party, F(4, 
216) = 17.23, p< .001. Republicans (M=5.56, SD=1.68) scored higher on the dependent 
measure than did all other groups: Democrats (M=3.06, SD=1.75), Libertarians (M=3.93, 
SD=2.01), those who identified “None” as their party identification (M= 2.81, SD=1.61), 
and those who indicated an “other” party identification (M=3.30, SD=2.28). Aside from 
Republicans, none of these groups significantly differed from each other.  
Religion. There were also significant differences in EP scores by religious 
identity, F(7, 213) = 5.39,  p<.001. Atheists (M=2.49, SD=1.54) scored lower than did 
Protestant Christians (M=4.34, SD=2.21), Catholic Christians (M=4.57, SD=1.52), and 
Other Christians (M=4.35, SD=2.15).  No other mean differences between groups were 
significant.  
Condition. There were no differences on EP scores by condition, F(1, 219)= .007, 
p=.934. 
Main Results 
Three models were tested using regression: the first examined the main effects of 
religious fundamentalism, expertise, and condition; the second tested the significance of 
the two-way interaction between these variables; the third tested the significance of a 
three-way interaction between these three. The dependent variable was the mean score on 
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the support for militant counterterrorism policies measure (Appendix B).  This set of 
regression models was run twice, first without any controls, and then with ideology and 
party identification entered as controls.   
Results at Step 1 
Full regression results are presented without controls in Regression Model A (see 
Table 5), and with controls in Regression Model B (see Table 6). 
Table 5. Regression Model A: Hypothesis-Testing Regression Model without Controls 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 3.564 (.128)** 3.649 (.134)** 3.645 (.136)** 
Religious fundamentalism 
(RRF) 
.682 (.132)** .676 (.134)** .678 (.135)** 
Condition (CON) [-1 to 
+1] 
-.001(.128) .015 (.127) .005 (.136) 
Political Expertise (PE) -.244 (.132)+ -.320 (.138)* -.318 (.139)* 
CON x RRF -- -.001(.134) 0.00 (.135) 
CON x PE -- -.114 (.136) -.108 (.139) 
PE X RRF -- .290 (.154)+ .282 (.160)+ 
PE X RRF X CON -- -- -.033 (.160) 
+ p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01  
Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors presented in 
parentheses. 
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Table 6. Regression Model B: Hypothesis-Testing Regression Model with Controls 
 Model 1 (Main 
Effects) 
Model 2  
(2-way 
interaction) 
Model 3 (3-way 
interaction) 
Constant 2.749 (.262)** 2.836 (.263)** 2.783 (.269)** 
Party ID (control) 
     Democrat vs. none 
     Republican vs. none 
     Libertarian vs. none 
     Other party vs. none 
 
.716(.326)* 
1.932(.410)** 
1.056(.476)* 
.447(.491) 
 
.772(.329)* 
1.968 (.412)** 
1.025 (.477)* 
.464 (.493) 
 
.772(.329)* 
1.968 (.412)** 
1.025 (.477)* 
.464 (.493) 
Ideology (control) .496(.166)** .508 (.166)** .508 (.166)** 
Religious fundamentalism 
(RF) 
.302 (.137)* .287 (.139)* .287 (.139)* 
Condition (CON) [-1 to 1] -.044 (.116) -.071(.124) -.071(.124) 
Political Expertise (PE) -.188 (.120) -.265 (.126)* -.265(.126)* 
CON x RF -- -.059 (.121) -.057(.121) 
CON x PE -- -.137 (.123) -.114 (.126) 
PE X RF -- .276 (.139)* .240 (.144)+ 
PE X RF X CON -- -- -.137(.146) 
+ p<.10   *p<.05  **p<.01 
Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors presented in 
parentheses. 
 
Main Effects at Step 1 
At step 1, religious fundamentalism was a significant predictor of the dependent 
variable when controls were omitted, b=.682, SE=.132, t(217)=5.181, p<.001. It remained 
a significant predictor even in the model controlling for ideology and party identification, 
b=.302, SE=.137, t(212)=2.211, p=.028. These findings support Hypothesis 1: religious 
fundamentalism positively predicts militaristic policy attitudes. The finding that this 
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effect persisted, even when controlling for ideology and party, suggests that religious 
fundamentalism’s effects cannot be fully explained via liberal-conservative ideology or 
party identification. 
While not predicted, there was also a marginally significant negative effect of 
political expertise on the dependent variable at step 1 in regression Model A, b=-.244, 
SE=.132, t(217)= -1.853, p=.065. This marginal effect was attenuated when controls were 
entered, b=-.188, SE=.120, t(212)= -1.567, p=.119. This suggests that political experts are 
less likely than novices to endorse militaristic counterterrorism policies, but this effect 
may be partially due to ideological and partisan differences.  
There was no effect of condition whether controls were omitted (b=-.001, 
SE=.128, t(217)=-.004, p=.997) or entered (b=.-044, SE=.116, t(212)=-.382, p=.703).  
At Step 1 presented in Regression Model B, where ideology, political expertise, 
and fundamentalism were controlled for, party identification also exerted an effect2. 
Endorsement of militant tactics remained significantly higher among Republicans 
b=1.932, SE=.410, t(212)=4.711, p<.001 and Libertarians b=1.056, SE=.476, 
t(112)=2.219, p=.028. Democratic Party identification was also a positive predictor of 
endorsement of militant tactics, b=.716, SE=.326, t(212)=2.198, p=.029. This suggests 
that, when holding ideology constant, identification with the Democratic Party (vs. no 
party identification) relates to greater endorsement of militaristic tactics. Ideology also 
was a significant predictor of the DV, even when controlling for party identification, with 
                                                          
2 As in the previous ANOVA analysis, Party identifications with N<5 (Green, Constitution, Reform) were 
combined with the “Other” group.  
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conservative self-placement relating to higher endorsement of militaristic tactics, b=.304, 
SE=.102, t(2.985), p=.003. 
Two-way Interactions at Step 2 
 The hypothesized two-way interaction between condition and religious 
fundamentalism did not emerge when controls were omitted, b= -.001, SE=.134, t(214)=-
.005, p=.996. It also was not significant when controls were included, b= -.059, SE=.121, 
t(209)=-.484, p=.629. This result supports the null hypothesis that the priming 
manipulation did not differentially influence high- versus low-fundamentalists. This 
result could also be consistent with a three-way interaction between fundamentalism, 
condition, and expertise, wherein political expertise moderates a differential effect of the 
prime on fundamentalists. There was no two-way interaction between political expertise 
and condition in either model, Regression Model A: B=-.114, SE=.136, t(214)=-.838, 
p=.403; Regression Model B: B=-.137, SE=.123, t(209)=-1.109, p=.269.   
 There was, however, a significant two-way interaction between religious 
fundamentalism and political expertise in Regression Model B, b=.276, SE=.139, 
t(209)=1.992, p=.048.  In Model A, this was a marginally-significant interaction: b=.290, 
SE=.154, t(214)=1.882, p=.061. While this interaction was not formally predicted, it is 
consistent with the assumptions of Hypothesis 3a: that the effects of religious 
fundamentalism on counterterrorism attitudes differs between political experts and 
novices.  
 The significant interaction between fundamentalism and expertise in Regression 
Model B was further examined. Following Aiken and West (1991), a regression model 
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identical to Regression Model B was run, except replacing the political expertise with a 
variable representing high political expertise (computed by subtracting one standard 
deviation from each political expertise score). The two interaction terms that included 
political expertise were also recalculated using the new “high political expertise” 
variable. This model demonstrates the effect of religious fundamentalism among those 
high in political expertise. A similar model was created to demonstrate the effect of 
religious fundamentalism among political novices, using a variable that represented low 
political expertise. Among political experts, religious fundamentalism was a significant 
positive predictor of the dependent variable, b=.556, SE=.194, t(209)=2.861, p=.005.  
Among political novices, religious fundamentalism did not significantly predict the 
dependent variable, b=004, SE=.197, t(209)= -.021, p=.983. Therefore, when controlling 
for ideology and party identification, the relationship between religious fundamentalism 
and support for militant tactics only emerged among political experts. This interaction is 
illustrated in Figure 1 below.  
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Figure 1. Endorsement of Militant Policies by Political Expertise and Religious 
Fundamentalism 
 
Note: In this figure, the term “Political Novices” represents those who score one standard 
deviation below the mean on the political expertise measure; “Political Experts” 
represents those who score one standard deviation above the mean on the political 
expertise measure.  
 
 
At step 2 in Regression Model B, the effect of political expertise also became 
significant, b=-.270, SE=.126, t(209)=-2.147, p=.033. This suggests that when the other 
variables and their two-way interactions are accounted for, political experts are less likely 
to endorse militant techniques.  
Three-Way Interaction at Step 3 
The three-way interaction between political expertise, condition, and religious 
fundamentalism was not significant either when controls were entered (b=-.137, SE=.146, 
t(208)=-.939, p=.349) or omitted (b=-.033, SE=.160, t(213)=-.208, p=.835). Therefore 
there is no support for either of the competing predictions of Hypothesis 3a and 3b. This 
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also confirms that there was no two-way interaction between fundamentalism and 
condition that was being “masked” by a crossover interaction with political expertise at 
step 3.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Discussion 
Null Effects of Prime 
 The intent of this study was to study how religious fundamentalism affected 
attitudes towards such controversial policies as harsh interrogations and the use of 
nuclear weapons. In particular, a secularism prime was predicted to differentially affect 
attitudes of people high and low in fundamentalism. This priming manipulation turned 
out to have no effect, either as a main effect or interacting with measured variables.  
The null effect of the secularism article can be interpreted as an encouraging 
finding. These participants’ attitudes to the presented controversial techniques were not 
swayed by an incidental prime. It suggests that such attitudes are “fixed” and not easily 
situationally manipulated. However, previous research has found that a mortality salience 
prime was sufficient to shift attitudes toward violence and military interventions (e.g. 
Pyszczynski et al., 2006; Rothschild, Abdollahi and Pyszczynski, 2009). Similarly, 
research indicates that societal economic threat causes shifts in attitudes among certain 
people to be more authoritarian (e.g. Sales, 1973; Feldman & Stenner, 1997). 
 It is important to consider how this experiment differed from previous research, 
and why it did not produce the predicted effect. A simple explanation for the present null 
effects is that the present secularism prime did not function as a threat akin to previously- 
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studied ones, like economic insecurity or mortality. One potential reason for this is that 
the article was insufficiently attended to or understood by the participants. This is 
unlikely. All subjects whose responses were analyzed were able to report a reasonable 
summary of the article after reading it. Also, these results do not show even a non-
significant trend in the predicted direction. It does not seem that the stimulus was simply 
insufficiently understood.  
It is possible that the secularism prime was a threatening stimulus for 
fundamentalists, but that it did not cause shifts in counterterrorism attitudes as 
predicted.  Perhaps given a different dependent variable, such as death-thought 
accessibility, the expected interaction would have been observed. Political attitudes in a 
more explicitly religion-relevant domain (such as abortion, or construction of an Islamic 
center in lower Manhattan) may be more likely to be shifted by the prime. A larger study 
with an array of dependent variables would best be able to explore this possibility. 
 Finally, the conclusion of particular theoretical interest may be that rising 
atheism in society simply does not constitute a threat to fundamentalists. It does not cue 
the same processes that economic instability, mortality salience, or direct critiques of 
scripture do. According to this explanation, the knowledge that others lack faith simply 
does not prevent fundamentalists from being secure in their own faith. As Friedman and 
Rholes (2007) found, religious fundamentalists were less likely to use worldview-
defensive techniques when under a mortality threat than non-fundamentalists were. It 
may be that for fundamentalists, social validation in the political realm is not a 
prerequisite for psychological security.  
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Finally, fundamentalists in the US may, indeed, already perceive themselves to be 
a shrinking minority. The “news” provided in this study that the country is becoming 
saturated with atheism may be seen as “old news” by fundamentalists. If fundamentalists 
chronically perceive this to be the case, then it is unsurprising that the prime delivered no 
effect.  
Support for Hypothesis 1 (Even with Controls) 
As predicted, religious fundamentalism was found to be a significant predictor of 
endorsing extreme counterterrorism policies. Because religious fundamentalism 
correlates with conservatism and Republican Party identification, this was not a 
surprising finding. However, it is interesting that it remained a significant predictor even 
when controlling for ideology and party identification. It suggests that there is a 
relationship between one’s attitude toward their religion and their attitude toward defense 
policies, and that this relationship cannot fully be explained by political group 
membership.   
Interaction between Expertise and Religious Fundamentalism 
Perhaps the most interesting result of this study was the two-way interaction that 
emerged between political expertise and religious fundamentalism. The interaction 
revealed that when controlling for party identification and ideology, religious 
fundamentalism is only associated with counterterrorism attitudes among political 
experts. Among political novices, religious fundamentalism did not explain any unique 
variance in endorsement. This pattern of results was not explicitly predicted, but was 
implied by Hypothesis 3a. Instead of moderating a 2-way interaction between condition 
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and fundamentalism (which did not emerge), expertise moderated the primary effect of 
fundamentalism. 
Expertise was proposed as a moderator because it affects the degree to which 
political attitudes are "constrained" ideologically. That is, people who score high in 
political expertise tend to have political attitudes more organized in typical 
"conservative" or "liberal" packages (e.g. Converse, 1964). Political novices tend to have 
less ideologically-organized attitudes, perhaps due to a limited understanding of 
mainstream ideologies, or due to the use of some rubric other than ideology to organize 
their attitudes. Religious fundamentalism, however, is not construed as a political attitude 
per se, but as a "pre-political" psychological construct (in the family of constructs 
occupied by Social Dominance Orientation, authoritarianism, need for closure, etc.).  
This finding offers some clues as to how religious fundamentalism influences 
political attitudes. One hypothesis would be that religious fundamentalism is a 
psychological predisposition that has a direct effect on the measured attitudes. Someone 
who is high in fundamentalism is more likely to derogate outgroup members, for 
example, and find it easier to endorse harsh policies against them. This explanation 
would require no understanding of ideology -- it would exist even in the absence of the 
constructs of liberalism and conservatism. 
On the other hand, it may be that high-religious fundamentalists tend to adopt a 
certain branch of conservative ideology (and low-fundamentalists a different ideology), 
and then apply this ideological "rubric" to their attitudes. According to this hypothesis, 
the low-fundamentalist opposition to harsh interrogation, for example, is mediated by 
ideological understanding. The present interaction supports this hypothesis. If there were 
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a direct effect of fundamentalism on counterterrorism attitudes, political expertise should 
have no bearing on the degree to which the two variables correlate. Similarly, if 
fundamentalism primarily motivated the politically unsophisticated, its effects should be 
most pronounced among those low in political expertise. Instead, we find a clear 
relationship between fundamentalism and counterterrorism policy attitudes only among 
those high in political expertise. This suggests that religious fundamentalism’s effects are 
mediated by an ideological understanding that is more nuanced than a simple liberal-
conservative dichotomy, as this was controlled for.  
This pattern of results reflects recent research conducted by Federico, Fisher and 
Deason (2011) on American National Election Studies data from 2000 and 2004. The 
authors found that, consistent with much other research, authoritarianism was correlated 
with conservative ideology. But they also found this relationship was stronger among 
political experts than novices. The authors concluded that political expertise may be 
necessary for pre-political personality dimensions to be tied together with ideological 
attitudes. Authoritarianism, rather than being an irrational disposition used primarily the 
unsophisticated (e.g. Christie, 1954), seems to have its largest effect among the most 
knowledgeable. As fundamentalism so closely relates to authoritarianism, the findings of 
the present study lend support to Federico et al.’s (2011) conclusions.  
Interestingly, a look at the pattern of results (Figure 6, above) reveals that the true 
"outliers" in terms of counterterrorism attitudes are the low-fundamentalists who are high 
in expertise. Controlling for party and ideology, the other three groups (high-expertise 
high-fundamentalists, low-expertise high-fundamentalists, low-expertise low-
fundamentalists) had equivalent attitudes toward the dependent variable.  Strong 
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opposition to these policies (above and beyond ideology and party identification) seems 
to result from a combination of both high expertise and low fundamentalism. 
Limitations and Future Research 
A big limitation of this study is the narrowly constructed dependent variable, 
along with the lack of manipulation checks. Because this specifically-construed study 
presented null results, we are unable to conclude what part of the theoretical predictions 
were unsupported (was the stimulus non-threatening? Or was a threat perceived, but that 
threat did not induce attitude change in this domain?). In future research, it would be 
beneficial to present the stimulus with a variety of different dependent measures. A good 
candidate would be an explicit mood measurement, to see if people’s conscious affective 
reactions to secularism vary by their level of fundamentalism. Another should be a simple 
“death thought accessibility” measure using word completion (e.g. Schimel et al., 2007). 
This measure can assess whether a mortality threat has occurred on an unconscious level. 
These measures assess more directly whether secularism information is perceived as 
“threatening” to a subset of the population. This may be wise to do, before testing again 
whether such a threat (if it exists) affects policy stances.  
Additionally, it would be beneficial to present participants with more of an array 
of policy options. Research suggests a variety of counterterrorism strategies Americans 
have endorsed, including “seeking understanding” (Henderson-King et al., 2004) and 
“cooperative internationalism” (Guth, 2009). If effects were found on the dependent 
measure, it would be important to distinguish militarism from these other constructs. If 
only militarism is measured (as it was in this study), it could be argued that the prime 
simply induced differences in interventionism or acquiescence to policies. Measuring 
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multiple types of counterterrorism responses would allow us to draw conclusions about 
the type of response that is particularly elicited under certain conditions.  
While this study was designed to explore the effects of a certain, potentially 
threatening prime, its most interesting result was the moderating role of political 
expertise. Future studies should explore this role of political expertise in constraining 
national security attitudes. The present study used a “short form”, 5-item test of political 
expertise, on which there was not a wide variation in performance.  A longer, more 
sensitive instrument may reveal stronger effects.  Also, more constructs relating to 
political knowledge, such as political interest, political news consumption, and perhaps 
general education level, should be measured. This may help refine our understanding of 
why political knowledge seems to exert the observed constraining effect.  
General Conclusion 
 This study proposed an unusual intertwining of religion and politics: that news in 
the domestic, religious domain would affect attitudes in a realm that is ostensibly secular: 
how to deter terrorism. This unusual effect was not found, offering the encouraging idea 
that counterterrorism attitudes are resistant to this sort of priming. This research did, 
however, demonstrate that religious fundamentalism does “entangle” with such attitudes, 
even when controlling for self-placement on an ideological scale. That this special 
relationship seems to hold true only for political experts suggests that political knowledge 
is instrumental in tying religious attitudes to policy preferences. Just how and why that 
process occurs, particularly when controlling for ideology, should be the subject of 
further inquiry. 
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CONTROL STIMULUS 
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Low-Calorie Menus Gaining Popularity 
 
Diners are increasingly seeking out restaurants that offer lower-calorie main dishes, sides 
and even cocktails, according to a Hudson Institute study released Thursday. For 
restaurants it's a profitable move. And for health-minded diners, it's an easy way to keep 
those New Year's promises to eat healthier, and be able to eat out at the same time. 
According to the Hudson Institute, lower-calorie items accounted for 37.5 percent of all 
servings sold at the surveyed restaurants in 2011. “Consumers are voting with their feet. 
Nobody’s selling these items very hard. Demand is showing up here. You can’t ignore 
the consumer,” said Henry J. Cardello, a senior fellow and director at the Washington, 
D.C.-based Hudson Institute Obesity Solutions Initiative. The study included large chains 
like McDonald’s, Applebee’s, Denny’s Outback and Olive Garden. 
One example is Cheesecake Factory, a restaurant known for out-of-control portion sizes. 
The company added a SkinnyLicious menu in 2011, with 50 items less than 590 calories. 
They sponsored a New Year’s resolution twitter contest with prices like running shoes 
and yoga classes. Based on the company twitter feed #skinnylicious, it's popular among 
fitness followers and families.  
Overall, restaurants that increased their lower-calorie offerings saw an increase in total 
traffic of 10.9 percent between 2006 and 2011. Brands that didn’t increase their lower-
calorie offerings, or decreased them, saw foot traffic drop 14.7 percent and same-store 
sales dip 5.5 percent during the five-year period. 
“We found that those restaurant chains that were growing their lower-calorie time on the 
menu…demonstrate business advantages,” said Cardello. “They’re seeing their same-
store sales grow. They’re seeing customer traffic increase.” 
As restaurants add calorie counts and nutrition labeling to menus, this trend is predicted 
to gain even more popularity. “We could see the growth in lower-calorie items accelerate 
even faster,” said Dr. James Marks, senior vice president and director of the health group 
at Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, during a press conference discussing the findings. 
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APPENDIX B 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE MEASURE 
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Support for Militant Counterterrorism Policies (Except where indicated, these items are 
from Barnes, Brown & Osterman, 2012) 
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements (1 = strongly 
disagree, 9 = strongly agree). 
I am in favor of the United States’ war against terrorism. 
 
Not enough of the United States’ money is spent battling terrorism. 
 
It is entirely appropriate to engage in preemptive attacks on countries that are suspected 
of harboring or supporting terrorists.* 
 
Any person affiliated with fundamentalist Muslim sects in the United States should be 
deported from the country.* 
 
If necessary, the United States should use nuclear weapons to defend its interests against 
those of terrorists.* 
 
If necessary, the United States should use chemical weapons to defend its interests 
against those of terrorists.* 
  
Interrogators should be able to query suspected terrorists using any questioning technique 
at their disposal, no matter how extreme it is. 
 
Interrogators should do everything in their power to draw information out of suspected 
terrorists, even if it means using methods that cause those persons lasting physical or 
psychological problems. 
 
Interrogators should assume there are "no holds barred" when they question suspected 
terrorists; whatever they must do to guarantee the safety of the nation is acceptable. 
 
Interrogators' efforts to obtain information from suspected terrorists should not be 
restricted in any way. 
  
Interrogators should abide by international laws that protect the rights and welfare of 
detainees, even if those detainees are suspected terrorists.** 
 
* Originally from Pyszczynski, Abdollahi, Solomon, Greenberg, Cohen, & Weise (2006) 
 
**Edited for clarity by Chase Wilson. Original (Barnes, Brown & Osterman, 2012) read: “Interrogators 
should not be exempt from abiding by international laws that protect the rights and welfare of detainees, 
even if those detainees are suspected terrorists” 
 56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX C 
ENDORSEMENT OF MILITANT COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES 
BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
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Party 
Identification 
Mean N Standard 
Deviation 
No party 2.81 43 1.61 
Democrat 3.06  102 1.75 
Republican 5.56 41 1.68 
Libertarian 3.93 18 2.01 
Other 3.30 17 2.28 
Total 3.56 221 2.02 
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 APPENDIX D  
ENDORSEMENT OF MILITANT COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES 
BY RELIGION 
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Religious 
Orientation 
Mean N Std. 
Deviation 
Christian-
Protestant 
4.34 40 2.21 
Christian-Catholic 4.57 23 1.52 
Christian-Other 4.35 34 2.15 
Jewish 3.30 4 2.67 
Muslim 3.57 4 2.47 
Buddhist 3.27 10 2.46 
No affiliation 3.34 17 2.08 
Atheist 2.49 48 1.54 
Agnostic 3.03 32 1.65 
Other 3.11 9 1.31 
Total 3.5 221 2.02 
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APPENDIX E 
 
ENDORSEMENT OF MILITANT COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES 
 
BY GENDER 
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Gender N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error of the 
Mean 
Male 93 3.67 2.01 .209 
Female 128 3.48 2.04 .180 
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